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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
issues. An objective of the series is to get the findings out quickly, even if the presentations are less than fully polished. The papers carry the 
names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
Policy Research Working Paper 5693
This paper aims to assist policy makers interested in 
establishing or strengthening financial strategies to 
increase the financial response capacity of developing 
country governments in the aftermath of natural 
disasters, while protecting their long-term fiscal balance. 
Contingent credit is shown to increase the ability of 
governments to self-insure by relaxing their short-term 
liquidity constraints. In many situations, contingent 
credit is most effectively used to facilitate risk retention 
for middle layers, with reserves used for bottom layers 
and risk transfer (for example, reinsurance) for top layers. 
This paper is a product of the Non-Banking Financial Institutions Unit of the Global Capital Market Development 
Department, Finance and Private Sector Development Vice Presidency. It is part of a larger effort by the World Bank to 
provide open access to its research and make a contribution to development policy discussions around the world. Policy 
Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http://econ.worldbank.org. The authors may be contacted at 
omahul@worldbank.org. The authors thank the participants of the World Bank seminar on March 7, 2011, and the 
Research Workshop at the Center for the Study of African Economies on May 11, 2011, University of Oxford, for their 
comments and feedback.
   Discussions with governments on the optimal use 
of contingent credit instruments as part of a sovereign 
catastrophe risk financing strategy can be guided by the 
output of a dynamic financial analysis model specifically 
developed to allow for the provision of contingent credit, 
in addition to reserves and/or reinsurance. This model is 
illustrated with three country case studies: agricultural 
production risks in India; tropical cyclone risk in Fiji; and 
earthquake risk in Costa Rica. 
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1.  Introduction 
How should a government vulnerable to natural disasters arrange its public finances? 
One simple approach would simply be to ‘wait and see’, with the intention of arranging a loan after 
the occurrence of a disaster to finance reconstruction. While this is likely to be a reasonable strategy 
for much reconstruction, despite the potentially higher post-disaster cost of borrowing (Ozcan 
2005), it is not appropriate for the financing of immediate post-disaster liquidity needs, such as the 
reconstruction of key public infrastructure such as bridges or hospital or the financial compensation 
of affected households, since arranging a reasonably priced loan in the aftermath of a disaster takes 
time (Ghesquiere and Mahul, 2010). 
A second approach would be to pre-fund a budget allocation or reserve fund, with government 
either borrowing or accumulating tax revenues to hold in liquid assets to act as a quick disbursement 
facility.  However, while some states have access to substantial sovereign wealth funds which can be 
disbursed quickly in the aftermath of a disaster (Kern 2007), for many others there are significant 
political economy constraints on the size of such a fund in the short or medium term, limiting their 
ability to fully pre-fund post-disaster liquidity needs. 
Third, a government could purchase reinsurance or other risk transfer instruments such as index 
linked securities, paying an annual premium in return for quick cash in the event of a predefined 
disaster.  Whilst such risk transfer may be appropriate for extreme events, it is likely to be expensive 
for more frequent events.  Moreover, reinsurance operates using a hard trigger (e.g., the magnitude 
of an earthquake or the intensity of an hurricane) , with claim payments a clearly defined function of 
realized events, and may not provide protection against all possible catastrophes.  This is particularly 
true for the recently popular indexed insurance, which offers only a hedge against exposure, and 
exposes policyholders to basis risk, the risk that insurance claim payments do not accurately reflect 
the incurred loss. 
Finally, a government could arrange a line of credit in advance, to be drawn down in the event of a 
disaster. As for a commitment loan, the credit contract between lender and government would 
specify how the interest rate would be determined, the maturity of the loan, and how the loan could 
be put to use (Greenbaum and Thakor 2007). However, the contract could also specify that a loan 
could only be disbursed in the event of a disaster. This could have either a hard trigger, as for 
reinsurance, or a soft trigger, such as the declaration of state of emergency by the government.   As 
with the first and second option, government would still retain risk, and like the second option this 
could be used to finance post-disaster liquidity needs, spreading the effect of any disaster over 
multiple years. However, ex-post liquidity financing may be subject to fewer political economy 
constraints than ex-ante reserving. 
Contingent credit with a soft trigger is similar to relationship banking since, although a government 
could trigger drawdown at any time, this would be costly and would harm their reputation with 
lenders (Boot 2000); by improperly declaring an emergency, government would essentially be 
swapping ‘relationship capital’ for financial capital (Boot et al. 1993). 
The paper argues that the optimal strategy for financing post-disaster liquidity needs for a 
government subject to restrictions on their budget allocation or reserve fund is likely to include both 
risk retention through reserving and contingent credit and risk transfer through reinsurance and 
other such instruments. The underlying theoretical model suggests a risk layering approach with 
reserves financing small losses and contingent credit and reinsurance providing addition financial 
capacity for moderate and catastrophic losses (see Figure 1). 
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Figure 1.  Risk layering and disaster risk financing strategy 
 
Source: Ghesquiere and Mahul (2010) 
 
In practice governments may find the decision about what precise disaster risk financing strategy to 
implement to be somewhat challenging. In addition to theoretical models, this paper presents 
output of a dynamic financial model, developed to run in MS Excel, which allows decision makers to 
compare alternative risk financing strategies. The model has been designed as a tool to assist 
countries in developing cost-effective disaster risk financing strategy based on a combination of 
reserves, contingent credit and risk transfer instruments (e.g. reinsurance). The tool does not 
calculate an optimal strategy, but rather calculates projections that can help financial specialists to 
engage with governments on disaster risk financing. 
While the principles in this paper apply more generally, particular attention is given to the World 
Bank’s Development Policy Loan (DPL) with Catastrophe Risk Deferred Drawdown Option, DPL with 
CAT DDO.  This product offers IBRD-eligible countries immediate liquidity up to USD$500 million or 
0.25 percent of GDP (whichever is less) if they suffer a natural disaster, providing bridge financing 
while other sources of post-disaster funding are being mobilized and allowing for budget support to 
governments hit by a natural disaster.  Funds are disbursed when a country suffers a natural disaster 
and declares a state of emergency; since a state may declare a state of emergency for a number of 
reasons, some difficult to foresee, this soft trigger may capture more events than reinsurance.  
Eligible borrowers must have an adequate macroeconomic framework in place at inception and 
renewal, and a disaster risk management program that is monitored by the World Bank. 
The first DPL with CAT DDO was approved by the World Bank’s Board of Executive Directors in 
September 2008.  The US$65 million contingent loan to the Government of Costa Rica aims to 
enhance its capacity to “implement a Disaster Risk Management Program for natural disasters.”  This 
program is described in the loan doument and agreed upon before signing.  Following the 6.2 
magnitude earthquake that hit Costa Rica on January 8, 2009, the Government of Costa drew down 
approximately US$15 million.  DPLs with CAT DDO have since been negotiated with 
Colombia ($150m), Peru ($100m), El Salvador ($50m) and Guatemala ($85m) and are currently 
under preparation in various other countries. 
As of May 2010, the DPL with CAT DDO has the same lending base rate as regular IBRD loans.  The 
front-end-fee, payable upon effectiveness, is 0.5% and there is no commitment fee.  The draw down 
period is for three years, renewable up to four times (with a renewal fee of 0.25%).  Repayment 
terms may be determined either upon commitment, or upon drawdown within prevailing maturity 
policy limits. Repayment schedule would commence from date of drawdown. The CAT DDO is an 
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disaster risk financing strategy, as part of their overall disaster risk management program.  
Contingent credit can complement other risk retention tools (such as reserves) and risk transfer 
instruments (including catastrophe insurance). 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows.  Section ‎ 2 presents theoretical rationales for optimal 
contingent credit purchase.  It derives a simple formula for the contingent credit multiple, which can 
be compared with reinsurance multiples to assess value for money from a risk neutral government. 
It then offers an analysis of the contingent credit purchase decision using a variation of the two 
period canonical lifetime consumption model for a risk-averse government.    Section ‎ 3 discusses the 
results of the contingent credit DFA model, as applied to three illustrative risks: agricultural 
production risk in India; tropical cyclone risk in Fiji; and earthquake risk in Costa Rica.  Section ‎ 4 
concludes. 
 
2.  Theoretical rationales for contingent credit 
This section provides two alternative theoretical frameworks for thinking about the optimal use of 
savings, direct and contingent credit and reinsurance.  First we extend the concept of an insurance 
multiple, the ratio of the annual premium to the annual expected loss, to the context of direct and 
contingent debt.  This allows us to analyze the risk financing decision for a risk neutral government 
exposed to a potential liquidity crunch.  This approach is illustrated with a worked example.  Second, 
we present a stylized lifetime consumption model to characterize optimal financial planning for a 
risk-averse government.  Both models provide a theoretical motivation for the strategies modeled in 
Section 3. 
2.1. Calculating the effective multiple for contingent credit 
For a given layer of risk, the reinsurance (or insurance) multiple is typically defined as: 
 
                          
                          
                               
 
( 1 ) 
The reinsurance multiple for a given layer is simple to calculate for a given reinsurance premium and 
a given loss distribution.  Reinsurance multiples are typically greater than unity, to reflect the costs 
to the reinsurer of administration and accessing risk capital.  Multiples are often used by purchasers 
and sellers of reinsurance as an indication of the value for money of the product, with a lower 
multiple indicating better value for money for the reinsured.  For given operating costs, the multiple 
is expected to increase with high risk layers as the cost of capital increases with respect to the 
annual expected loss. 
Calculating an equivalent multiple for contingent credit is more complex for two reasons.  First, 
although reinsurance is typically an annual contract, a contingent credit contract may last for many 
years.  Multiples for contingent credit must therefore incorporate some subjective assumptions 
about how future cash flows will be discounted.  Second, contingent credit is typically purchased 
with a multi-year drawdown period, and is used for different layers in different years, depending on 
the start year savings available for retention.  Calculating the multiple for contingent credit on a 
multi-year basis would therefore require detailed assumptions about the entire risk financing 
strategy.  Given this, it is suggested that the multiple for contingent credit is calculated on an annual 
basis for a specific layer, even if the contingent credit contract is multi-year and expected to cover 
different layers in different years. 
The basic formula suggested for calculating the multiple for contingent credit is as follows: 
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where     denotes expected present value, with discounting using a subjective discount factor 
appropriate for the government, and the contingent credit repayment cash flow is only for debt 
drawn down during the year.  The formula is of the same basic structure as that for the reinsurance 
multiple; both multiples are defined by the expected present value of the cost of cover for a given 
layer, divided by the annual expected loss from that layer. 
Equation ( 2 ) can be simplified as follows.  Let       denote the subjective interest rate used by 
government for discounting future cashflows and   and   denote the term and contractual rate of 
interest applicable to any drawn down contingent loan respectively.  For the layer of interest let     
denote the maximum loss in the layer and     be a random variable denoting the incurred loss in 
the layer.  The average loss in the layer is therefore given by        and the loss-on-line is 
          .  The annualized fee in equation ( 2 ) may therefore be expressed as         where   is 
the annualized fee rate.    may be calculated as a simple average of total upfront and renewal fee 
rates over the maximum drawdown period.
3  Similarly denoting the expected present value of future 
loan repayments, per unit of drawn down loan, as        , then 
                                                          .  Substituting these equations 
into equation ( 2 ) and rearranging gives the following formula for the contingent credit multiple: 
                                
 
loss on line
           ( 3 ) 
where, as defined in the previous paragraph,   is the annualized fee rate and         is the 
expected present value of future loan repayments per unit of drawn down loan, with term  , 
subjective interest rate   and contractual rate of interest for loan repayment  . 
The first term in formula ( 3 ) arises from the upfront and renewal fee and the second arises from 
the interest and capital cost of servicing any drawn down debt.  Perhaps surprisingly, the final term 
does not depend on the distribution of losses in the layer, but depends only on the subjective 
discount rate to be used and the structure of the contingent credit contract.  This is because it is 
assumed that the expected present value of paying back contingent credit is linear in drawn down 
loan, resulting in a        term in the second term of the numerator in equation ( 2 ) which cancels 
with the        term of the denominator.  The contingent credit multiple is therefore linearly 
separable in the loss distribution and the terms for repayment of any drawn down loan. 
        may be written explicitly in terms of subjective and contractual interest rates   and   for a 
given schedule of repayment for any drawn down debt.  For example, if any loan was to be repaid by 
  level annual repayments, with the first payment due one year after the loan was originally drawn 
down, then the annual repayments would be     
 
         .  The expected present value of these 
level repayments using government’s subjective interest rate of   would then be: 
 
      
            
         
           
            
            
 
( 4 ) 
For full repayment at the end of one year, equation ( 4 ) simplifies to 
                                                           
 
3   could alternatively be calculated as a weighted average of fee rates, where the weights applicable to 
renewal fees reflected the expected loan available for drawdown at time of renewal.  However, such a 
calculation would depend on the entire strategy chosen by the government and would not necessarily be 
transparent.  In most circumstances it should be possible to derive an upper and lower bound for the 
annualized fee rate to use in equation ( 3 ), without reference to the precise strategy or loss distribution.  The 
contingent credit multiple is only sensitive to   for high layers with a very low loss-on-line, and so the 
approximation suggested in the main text, or the bounded approach suggested in this footnote should be 
adequate for the purposes of assessing the cost-effectiveness of contingent credit (see Figure 3).   6   
 
   
  
            
     
     
  
( 5 ) 
and for level annual repayments in perpetuity, equation ( 4 ) becomes 
      
            
 
 
   ( 6 ) 
Under the standard structure for the DPL with CAT DDO, only interest is paid for the first   years, 
with level annual capital repayments for the final       years resulting in an expected present value 
of repayments of: 
   
  
             
 
 
    
 
               
 
          
                
       
 
 
     
 
( 7 ) 
Figures 2 and 3 display illustrative CAT DDO multiples for a range of parameter values, using 
equations ( 3 ) and ( 7 ).  Consistent with Appendix 2 it is assumed that the term of any drawn down 
loan ( ) is 30 years, the grace period ( ) is 5 years, and the annualized fee rate ( ) is 
            
    
    .  Figure 2 takes the loss-on-line to be fixed at     and Figure 3 takes the rate of interest 
applicable to any draw down loan ( ) to be fixed at     . 
As can be seen from Figure 2, the contingent credit multiple is increasing in the contractual rate of 
interest   and decreasing in the opportunity cost of capital  .  The second term of equation ( 3 ) is 
equal to unity when      , and so for the assumed parameter values the contingent credit multiple 
equals      when      . 
Figure 2.  Contingent credit multiples, varying with contractual rate of interest payable on credit 
(loss-on-line      ,         ,       ,      ) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 3 the contingent credit multiple is not materially sensitive to the loss-on-
line or annualized fee rate when the former is more than ten times the latter;  multiples are almost 
unchanged when the loss-on-line is decreased from      to   , but change substantially when 
further reduced to     .  This arises from the first term of equation ( 3 ) equating to less than 0.1 
when  loss-on-line        .  One implication of this is that for low and medium layers for which the 
loss-on-line divided by the annualized fee rate is likely to be greater than ten, it is not necessary to 
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Figure 3.  Contingent credit multiples, varying with loss on line (        ,         ,       , 
     ) 
 
Formula ( 3 ) can also be used for calculating multiples for direct credit, in which case the upfront fee 
  would typically be zero and: 
                                      ( 8 ) 
where        is defined as above as the discounted present value of a loan repayments of unit debt, 
calculated at subjective interest rate  . 
2.2. Using multiples to compare risk financing strategies 
The choice of risk financing strategy by a risk neutral policy maker can be simplified through use of 
the multiples for direct credit, contingent credit and reinsurance. 
For example, consider the following situation.  A risk neutral government must finance a loss which 
takes the values   and zero with probabilities   and       respectively, and makes decisions with a 
subjective rate of interest of      .  The government must finance the loss through liquid assets but 
is otherwise unrestricted in its use of savings, direct credit, contingent credit and reinsurance. 
The government may borrow at low interest rate    up to a country exposure limit of      , and at 
a high interest rate    above  , where            .  Contingent credit within the country exposure 
limit may not contribute 100% towards the limit, but rather the direct and contingent credit within 
the limit,    and     respectively, must satisfy                 , where             .    might 
be set by the loan issuer to be less than      to reflect the low probability that a loan will be 
disbursed. 
Any debt must be repaid in full one year after draw down and the upfront fee for contingent credit is 
not material to the decision, and therefore assumed to be zero in the following calculations.  The 
multiples for direct or contingent credit up to and above the country exposure limit of   are 
therefore given by   
             
    
     and   
             
    
     respectively.  The reinsurance 
multiple is denoted   . 
If subjective interest rate   is greater than    or less than    a risk neutral government’s decision is 
trivial.  If        then the government will optimally borrow up to the full country exposure limit of 
  at low rate    and the maximum possible amount above the country exposure limit at high rate 
  , with loss   financed through reinsurance or contingent credit above the country exposure limit.  
If        the government would borrow the minimum amount possible, self-insuring through savings 
or contingent credit, or reinsuring.  The case of            , where borrowing within the country 
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Three intuitive strategies are described in column [2] of Table 1.  Under the first strategy the loss is 
fully reinsured, and under the second and third strategies the loss is financed through contingent 
credit above and within the country exposure limit of  , respectively.  A risk neutral government 
choosing between these three strategies would select the strategy with the smallest expected cost 
(column [5] of Table 1). 





if no loss 
incurred 
Realized cost if 
incur loss of   
Expected cost of strategy 
                          
[1]  [2]  [3]  [4]  [5] 
1 
Direct credit of  , 
invested in illiquid 
asset. 
Full reinsurance of 
potential loss. 
      
     
    
       
      
     
    
                
      
     
 
2 
Direct credit of  , 
invested in illiquid 
asset. 
Borrow   at    if a 
loss occurs. 
      
1+  1+   
       
     
     
    
       
                      
     
 
3 
Direct credit of 
      . 
Contingent credit 
of   at    if a loss 
occurs. 
           
    
    
       
       
     
          
    
    
       
                             
     
 
 
A risk neutral government would prefer contingent credit within the country exposure limit to 
contingent credit above the limit if the expected cost for strategy 3 is lower than that for strategy 2, 
that is if: 
                            ( 9 ) 
The left hand side of equation ( 9 ) reflects the opportunity cost of reducing the amount of direct 
credit within the country exposure limit to allow for an increase in contingent credit within the limit, 
and the right hand side is the expected increase in interest rate that would be payable if loss   was 
financed through contingent credit above the country exposure limit, instead of within the country 
exposure limit.  Reserving part of the country exposure limit for contingent credit is more likely to be 
preferred when the contribution of contingent credit towards the country exposure limit is low 
compared to the probability of drawdown (low    ), where borrowing within the country exposure 
limit is relatively unattractive (low       ) and where borrowing above the country limit exposure is 
much more expensive than borrowing within the limit (        is high). 
A risk neutral government would prefer to finance the loss through contingent credit instead of 
reinsurance if the expected cost of either strategy 2 or 3 is lower than that for strategy 1, that is if:   9   
 
   
         
      
     
 
         
           
 
     
  
( 10 ) 
This is more likely to bind when reinsurance is expensive (high reinsurance multiple   ), the 
subjective discount rate is high (high  ), borrowing above the country exposure limit is attractive 
(low   ), borrowing within the country exposure limit is unattractive (high   ), or the contribution of 
contingent credit towards the country exposure limit is low compared to the probability of 
drawdown (low    ).  The latter two dependencies arise from the following observation.  When 
      , borrowing within the country exposure limit is valuable, and the reservation of part of the 
country exposure limit for contingent credit is costly in that with probability       only       of 
cheap credit will be drawn down, instead of the maximum amount  .  The opportunity cost of 
foregoing cheap credit with probability       is lowest when     is low and the value of cheap 
credit is low (   is high).  Governments for whom credit within the country exposure limit is 
particularly valuable (   is low) are therefore unlikely to purchase contingent credit within the 
country exposure limit, although they may purchase contingent credit above the country exposure 
limit. 
For the three strategies examined above, the potential loss of   is financed by reinsurance or 
contingent credit.  The loss could instead be financed by savings or direct credit.  However, such 
financing strategies would be suboptimal if, for example, the rate of return available on liquid assets 
was less than   , and the rate of return available on illiquid assets was greater than   .  In such a 
case, savings or direct loans would be optimally invested in illiquid assets, which would not provide 
cash in the event of a loss   having been incurred.  
Calculations like those conducted above can be performed to compare strategies for a risk neutral 
government.  However, such calculations only allow comparison of the expected cost of alternative 
strategies, and do not make any allowance for any benefits from the transfer of risk to globally 
diversified pools. 
In the next section we introduce a lifetime consumption model which allows us to characterize 
optimal decision making when the government is risk averse, and acts as a prelude to the analysis of 
Section 3. 
 
2.3. A lifetime consumption model of contingent credit and risk financing 
A government lives for two periods, is exposed to one uncertain shock   in the first period and 
makes decisions that maximize expected utility, where time separable utility is given by:
4 
                         ( 11 ) 
Constant discount factor       embodies the degree of impatience, per period utility function   is 
strictly concave and net consumption    may be interpreted as required government expenditure 
net of any incurred shock.  The effect of a shock is therefore to increase the marginal utility of 
government expenditure.  Shock   is assumed to be atomless with full support over       , and 
probability density function denoted by     . 
                                                           
 
4 We ignore the possibility of shocks after year 1 for mathematical convenience, and therefore ignore any 
incentive for precautionary saving.  An N or infinite period model would have qualitatively similar optimal 
strategies (see Gollier, 2002).   10   
 
Immediately before the shock occurs, the policy maker must choose an indemnification schedule for 
insurance                        , and an amount of contingent credit to purchase      .  The 
markets for insurance and contingent credit are assumed to be perfectly competitive and so the 
agent is a price taker.  The insurance premium   is determined with a constant multiple of      , 
that is                            
  
  .  Contingent credit is subject to a front end fee of       and 
any drawn down loan is subject to interest rate of  , where   is strictly greater than the rate of 
return on savings  . 
At time-1 the agent experiences a shock of  , receives net (certain) income of    , pays front end fee 
of   , and receives net income from insurance of         .  The agent must also decide how much 
of the loan to draw down, denoted      where             , and how much to save for the next 
period, denoted         .
5  Total net consumption at time-1 is therefore: 
                                                   ( 12 ) 
At time-2 the agent receives income    , must fully repay any loan and will consume any remaining 
assets, resulting in consumption of: 
                                             ( 13 ) 
The agent’s problem is to choose constant   and state contingent functions                 to 
maximize expected utility, subject to the restriction that          for all  .  Formally, the problem 
may be written as the following program: 
 
   
                  
      
  
 
                                         
                                                                   
 
such that: 
( 14 ) 
 
                 
  
 
    
( 14a ) 
                                                   ( 14b ) 
Objective function ( 14 )  is the agent’s expected utility, equation ( 14a ) is the insurance premium 
equation and constraints ( 14b ) restrict the class of available products to those of insurance and 
contingent credit, and ensure that the agent is subject to a liquidity constraint on time-1 
consumption. 
We may now characterize the optimal solution with the following proposition. 
Proposition 1.  In any solution to program ( 14 ) with        there exist              , with    
nondecreasing in   such that the optimal savings, contingent credit drawdown and insurance 
purchase decisions are as follows: 
          :           ,                 and               ; 
           :                        ; 
           :                   ,           and               ; 
           :                   ,           ; 
                                                           
 
5 The solution would have the same form if the restriction was          for some      .  For      , the 
interpretation would be that the agent could borrow up to    at rate of interest  , or save any positive 
amount at rate of interest  .   11   
 
           :           ,                and            
Proof.  See Appendix 1. 
Any optimal strategy therefore involves the layering of risk, with risk retention through savings in the 
bottom layer, risk retention through contingent credit in a middle layer and risk transfer through 
insurance in the top layer.  Figure 4 and Figure 5 offer an illustration of an optimal schedule, as 
characterized in Proposition 1. 
The result that the optimal insurance schedule offers full marginal indemnification for losses above 
the deductible of    is driven by the assumption that insurance is priced with a fixed multiple of  , 
and corresponds to Arrow’s (1963) result.  Losses below    are retained by the government, and 
spread between time-1 and time-2 consumption through reduced savings and increased loan 
drawdown as appropriate. 
Figure 4.  Illustrative optimal plans for savings, debt and insurance under an assumption of a 
constant insurance multiple 
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For some parameter values some of these layers may have zero size, that is,          ,        or 
       .  For example, if insurance is too expensive (  is large) it may be optimal to not purchase any 
insurance.
6  However, as the following corollary shows, so the potential effect of a shock on 
government is large enough, the front end fee for contingent credit is small enough, and insurance is 
expensive enough, it will always be optimal for a government to purchase a positive amount of 
contingent credit. 
Corollary 1.  If there exists some   such that                  , then for small enough  , and large 
enough    and  , it will always be optimal to purchase a positive amount of contingent credit,     
 . 
Proof.  See Appendix 1. 
In the above model, in which insurance is priced with a fixed multiple, contingent credit is only ever 
optimally purchased for consumption smoothing in middle layers, with savings used for lower layers 
and insurance for higher layers.  The result that savings are employed for consumption smoothing in 
lower layers than for contingent credit is fairly robust, relying only on the assumption that the 
effective rate of interest applicable to the loan is higher than the effective rate of interest applicable 
to savings (     ).  Were the government to borrow positive amounts in a state in which savings 
were positive, the government could reduce      and      by                 and consume an 
additional                              at time-1, with unchanged consumption in time-2.  
Therefore, in our model contingent credit will only be drawn down when the government faces a 
liquidity crunch, that is where         . 
However, it may be optimal to purchase contingent credit for top layers and insurance for middle 
layers if the insurance multiple is sufficiently increasing in the loss. 
 
3.  Country Case Studies 
The theoretical models of Section ‎ 2 provide a justification for risk layering strategies combining 
savings, contingent credit and risk transfer.  In this section we will build upon the intuition from 
these models by presenting results generated from a stochastic Dynamic Financial Analysis (DFA) 
model for three illustrative risks: agriculture in India; tropical cyclones in Fiji; and earthquakes in 
Costa Rica.  We will therefore be able to give an indication of the likely order of magnitude of benefit 
from using contingent credit as part of a Disaster Risk Financing strategy.  We begin with a discussion 
of the DFA model used for the simulations. 
3.1. The DFA model 
Real life financing decisions for a government are typically more complex than those modeled 
theoretically in Section ‎ 2: governments exist for more than two periods and are subject to multiple 
risks.  Whilst governments will often have a good understanding of the strategies that could be 
employed, financial modeling is typically required to understand the mapping from strategies to 
outcomes.  The purpose of a dynamic financial analysis (DFA) model is to aid decision making, by 
illustrating the medium and long term differences between strategies.  
Just as a good economic theory model does not include all features of reality, a DFA model should be 
parsimonious, and should not necessarily be designed to provide a precise best estimate stochastic 
projection of the future.  The purpose of the contingent credit DFA (CC-DFA) model is to guide 
discussions with government on DRF and it should enable alternative strategies to be compared, 
                                                           
 
6 Conversely, if      , full insurance is optimal.   13   
 
with differing outcomes having a clear and robust explanation.  It is therefore acceptable to refrain 
from modeling any features of reality that affect all potential strategies in the same way, without 
having a material impact on the differences between strategies. 
In the CC-DFA model, a risk financing strategy is a decision about the size of the contingent credit 
facility to purchase at the outset and rules about reinsurance purchase and the drawdown of any 
contingent credit.  The only source of uncertainty in the model is that of the losses incurred in each 
year, which are assumed to be drawn from a specified loss distribution.  The model abstracts from 
the nature of the losses, and can therefore be applied to a range of disaster risks, such as 
earthquakes, hurricanes or droughts. 
The CC-DFA model outlined in this paper does not allow for other potential elements of a risk 
financing strategy, such as a dynamic fiscal allocation rule, or other sources of variation, such as 
investment returns, future portfolio size or composition, or reinsurance prices.  These features could 
be easily added but, whilst adding further realism to the model, are second order from the point of 
view of contingent credit purchase, and may make interpretation of the model outputs more 
difficult. 
At its core, a DFA model takes a risk financing strategy and a set of assumptions about future 
experience as inputs and deterministically projects the outcome.  The core equations at the heart of 
the CC-DFA model are as follows: 
                                                                 
                               
                                                
                                
                       
( 15 ) 
                                                   ( 16 ) 
Equation ( 15 ) can be explained as follows.  It is assumed that the government has a dedicated 
reserve fund which starts year   with liquid reserves of           and outstanding drawn down 
contingent credit of                   .  The fund is assumed to immediately receive an annual 
budget allocation to a dedicated reserve fund, resulting in net increase in liquid reserves of 
                    .  The fund then pays any reinsurance (          ), and in some years will 
pay a contingent credit upfront or renewal fee (      ).  Reinsurance and contingent credit 
purchase is determined by the risk financing strategy, with reinsurance premiums calculated based 
on the assumed multiples.  The financial conditions of the World Bank’s DPL with CAT DDO are used: 
the upfront fee of 0.50% of the contingent loan facility is payable at the start of year 1 and renewal 
fee of 0.25% of debt that has not yet been drawn down is payable at the start of years 4, 7 and 10.  
The fund earns interest of               on its reserves, and then at the end of the policy year 
may receive claim income from reinsurers (           ) and must meet additional expenditure of 
     .  The government must meet the interest cost of any loan outstanding at the start of the year 
(                          ) and may receive additional cash from drawing down additional 
debt of                                          .  Finally, the insurer earns interest on its 
reserves between the end of the policy year and the start of the next of               . 
Net reserves at time  ,             , are equal to the total liquid reserves of the fund minus any 
outstanding drawn down contingent loan                   . 
Given this core functionality, a large number of Monte Carlo simulations can be run using a specified 
risk financing strategy but with assumptions about future experience drawn from a specified 
probability distribution.  A decision maker can then compare the simulated distribution of outcomes 
for different risk financing strategies, and choose the strategy with the preferred distribution of 
outcomes.   14   
 
For decision makers to be able to make use of the power of the CC-DFA model, the presentation of 
results from the model is critical.  Since the purpose of a DFA model is to aid decision making, 
outputs from the model should directly relate to the preferences of decision makers.  A government 
might have preferences over: (i) The probability of a liquidity crunch occurring within ten years, that 
is where               for some       ; (ii) The distribution of net reserves at the end of ten 
years; and (iii) The amount of outstanding drawn down contingent credit at the end of ten years. 
For the distribution of net savings at the end of 10 years to hold meaning, one cannot simply ignore 
the consequences of a liquidity crunch occurring.  In the following we will quote the probability of a 
liquidity crunch occurring, and when quoting net savings will assume that in the event of a liquidity 
crunch the government can borrow further, albeit at a high interest rate, to meet its obligations. 
3.2. Description of the country case studies 
The CC-DFA model is illustrated through the discussion of three worked examples: multi-peril crop 
yield risk in India; tropical cyclones risk in Fiji; and earthquake risk in Costa Rica.  An overview of the 
assumptions and strategies used for projections may be found in Appendix 2.  We now describe the 
strategies and some of the assumptions in detail. 
There are a number of real life differences between these three examples but for the purpose of 
choosing an optimal amount of contingent debt to purchase, the key distinction is the distribution of 
losses: losses from Indian agricultural are frequent, but moderate; those from Fijian tropical cyclones 
are infrequent but severe; and those from Costa Rican earthquakes are rare but very severe (see 
Figure 6). 
Figure 6.  Mean return period of losses as proportion of Annual Expected Loss 
 
Figure 6 shows how much the risk profiles of these three illustrative examples differ.  The median 
loss is estimated at 86 percent for agriculture in India, 42 percent for tropical cyclones in Fiji, and 0 
percent for earthquakes in Costa Rica, all expressed in percentage of the respective annual expected 
loss (AEL) to facilitate comparison. 
For each example, the CC-DFA model has been calibrated with a collection of realistic financial 
assumptions about the cost of reinsurance, the initial reserves, the annual budget allocation to the 
reserve fund, the terms and conditions of the contingent credit (front end fee, renewal fee, interest 
rate, grace period, maturity, etc) and the maximum amount of contingent credit, etc.  Appendix 2 
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For each example we generate 5,000 ten year loss histories using the respective assumption about 
the distribution of losses.  We then apply two different strategies to the same set of loss histories:  
the first strategy involves no contingent credit purchase and the second involves positive contingent 
credit purchase.  By using the same loss histories for both strategies we are able to more precisely 
compare the effect of the strategies on the outcomes. 
The strategies assumed in each example are described below: 
Contingent credit strategy: In the simulations with contingent credit, it is assumed that contingent 
credit is only ever drawn down if reserves and any reinsurance income is not sufficient to meet the 
incurred loss.  In the event of such a loss, the minimum amount of contingent credit is drawn down, 
to ensure that end year liquid          are zero.  Any drawn down loan is paid back according to 
the schedule in Appendix 2.  
Reinsurance purchase strategy: The reinsurance purchase rules applied are as follows.  For all three 
examples we assume that in each year the government’s dedicated reserve fund purchases full stop 
loss reinsurance between an attachment point and an exhaust point, that is to say the reserve fund’s 
liability is capped at the attachment  point, unless losses exceed the exhaust point.  The exhaust 
point is always assumed to be equal to the 1-in-500 year loss, but the attachment point depends on 
the start year reserves and contingent debt not yet drawn down.  If start year reserves plus 
contingent credit not yet drawn down as a percentage of AEL are denoted by  , the attachment 
point as a percentage of AEL is given by                  .  Therefore, we assume that the 
attachment point is always at least 80% of AEL, and increases if reserves plus contingent credit is 
greater than 160% of AEL. 
Annual budget allocation:  Although we assume the same structure for reinsurance multiples in all 
three examples (see Appendix 2), the difference in loss distributions leads to a difference in 
reinsurance costs.  For example, as shown in Figure 7 the cost of full reinsurance for losses between 
the AEL and 1-in-500 year exhaust point varies from 47% of AEL (US$265m) for Indian agriculture to 
267% (US$20m) of AEL for Costa Rican earthquakes.  This is because we assume that reinsurance 
pricing multiple is higher for catastrophic shocks than for more moderate shocks.  For the dedicated 
reserve funds to be sustainable, we assume that initial reserves and annual budget allocation 
expressed as a multiple of the AEL are largest for Costa Rica, next largest for Fiji, and smallest for 
India. 
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India, exhaust of 464% of AEL
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In practice it is likely that annual budget allocation from the government would be a dynamic 
strategy; if the dedicated reserve fund’s reserves were particularly high the budget allocation would 
likely be low and if the dedicated reserve fund’s reserves were particularly low the budget allocation 
would likely be high.  However, we assume a static budget allocation rule, where the annual 
allocation is constant.  Our key results would follow through under a dynamic budget allocation 
strategy, but where good experience resulted in low average budget allocation from government as 
opposed to high end of ten year net reserves for the reserve fund. 
Borrowing in the event of a liquidity crunch: If risk retention ever leads to a liquidity crunch, we 
record the liquidity crunch event and in future years assume that all additional losses are funded by 
borrowing at the high rate of 8% per annum (see Appendix 2). 
Agriculture in India: For agriculture in India we assume that the dedicated reserve fund begins with 
reserves equal to 100% of the AEL (US$560m) and the annual net allocation from farmer insurance 
premiums and government subsidies is 130% of the AEL (US$730m).  The reinsurance exhaust point 
is set to equal the 1-in-500 year loss of 464% of the AEL (US$2.6bn) and the minimum attach point is 
set at 80% of the AEL (US$450m).  In one simulation we assume that the fund purchases contingent 
credit of 25% of AEL (US$140m) and in the other we assume that no contingent credit is purchased. 
Tropical cyclones in Fiji: For tropical cyclones in Fiji we assume that the dedicated reserve fund 
begins with reserves equal to 150% of the AEL (US$130m) and the annual net allocation from farmer 
insurance premiums and government subsidies is 190% of the AEL (US$160m).  The reinsurance 
exhaust point is set to equal the 1-in-500 year loss of 831% of the AEL (US$720m) and the minimum 
attachment  point is set at 80% of the AEL (US$70m).  In one simulation we assume that the fund 
purchases contingent credit of 35% of AEL (US$30m) and in the other we assume that no contingent 
credit is purchased. 
Earthquakes in Costa Rica: For earthquakes in Costa Rica we assume that the dedicated reserve fund 
begins with reserves equal to 400% of the AEL (US$30m) and the annual net allocation from farmer 
insurance premiums and government subsidies is 300% of the AEL (US$24m).  The reinsurance 
exhaust point is set to equal the 1-in-500 year loss of 3,391% of the AEL (US$260m) and the 
minimum attachment  point is set at 80% of the AEL (US$6m).  In one simulation we assume that the 
fund purchases contingent credit of 1,100% of AEL (US$85m) and in the other we assume that no 
contingent credit is purchased. 
 
3.3. Scenario analysis 
Before presenting the results of the stochastic simulations, we will discuss three scenarios for the 
case of agriculture in India that will help us interpret the results of the simulations (see Appendix 3). 
Figure 13 illustrates the modeled strategies for a scenario where realized losses are low, with 
average loss over the ten years of 85% of AEL.  In both strategies the fund’s reserves increase 
significantly to the end of the tenth year, with the strategy with contingent credit leading to reserves 
that are higher by 212% of AEL. 
Figure 14 illustrates the modeled strategies for a scenario where large losses are incurred in the final 
five years, but losses are low on average in the first five years.  In this scenario at the end of the 
tenth year the fund’s reserves are 71% of AEL for the strategy with no contingent credit and 155% of 
AEL for the strategy with contingent credit, an increase of 84% of AEL. 
Figure 15 finally illustrates a scenario in which a very large loss is incurred in the first year and a fairly 
large loss in the second year.  In the strategy with contingent credit, the reinsurance attachment 
point in the first year is higher than that in the strategy without contingent credit, leading to a larger 
retained loss.  The fund draws down a loan of 2% of AEL in the first year, and a further 15% in the 
second year, and reserves take longer to recover.  At the end of the tenth year the fund’s reserves   17   
 
are 7% of AEL for the strategy with contingent credit and 42% of AEL for the strategy without, a 
decrease of 35% of AEL. 
These strategies demonstrate the main advantages and disadvantages of contingent credit.  
Contingent credit allows the reserve fund to bear more risk and therefore save on reinsurance costs.  
However, by bearing more risk the fund exposes itself to the possibility that a series of years with 
high losses deplete reserves and force a drawdown of contingent debt, before reserves have built up 
sufficiently. 
 
3.4. Stochastic projections: Probabilities of liquidity crunch and contingent debt drawdown 
While it is important to analyze individual scenarios to understand the potential effects of 
contingent credit purchase, these three scenarios are not in any way representative of the likely 
outcomes.  To understand the difference in outcomes between a strategy with contingent credit 
purchase and one without, we run the CC-DFA model with 5,000 simulations, with losses drawn from 
the assumed probability distribution. 
As can be seen from Figure 8, the strategies incorporating contingent debt do not seem to lead to 
increases in the probability of a liquidity crunch, despite the increase in retained risk.  Indeed, by 
saving on reinsurance premiums in early years, and therefore facilitating a larger increase in the 
average growth in reserves in early years, strategies with contingent credit reduce the 10 year 
probability of a liquidity crunch occurring from 5.8% to 4.4% in the case of India, from 12.7% to 5.1% 
in the case of Fiji and from 4.4% to 0.0% in the case of Costa Rica. 
 
Figure 8.  Probability of uninsured loss exceeding reserves and contingent credit 
 
 
The cumulative probability that part of the contingent credit has been drawn down increases as time 
goes on (see Figure 9).  The probability of drawdown in early years is particularly low since we 
assume that the facilities begin with substantial reserves and receive annual net allocations from 
government that allow significant purchase of reinsurance.  In early years losses have to exceed the 
reinsurance exhaust point to trigger a drawdown of contingent credit.  In later years, the probability 
of drawdown is much higher since drawdown can be triggered by a series of years with reasonably 


































































India: No contingent loan facility India: 25% contingent loan facility
Fiji: No contingent loan facility Fiji: 35% contingent loan facility
Costa Rica: No contingent loan facility Costa Rica: 1,100% contingent loan facility  18   
 
contingent debt is at least partially drawn down by the end of year ten in the strategies involving 
contingent credit are 10.3% in the case of India, 8.7% in the case of Fiji and only 0.0% in the case of 
Costa Rica. 
 
Figure 9.  Cumulative probability that contingent credit drawdown is positive 
 
 
3.5. Stochastic projections: Net reserves 
Finally, we may compare the development of net reserves, by which we mean savings minus any 
outstanding debt, over time.  Recall that by assuming a static budget allocation strategy, we 
implicitly assume that any favorable loss experience results in an increase in reserves of the 
dedicated reserve fund.  In practice, any increase in reserves could instead be passed back to 
government through a reduced future allocation to the dedicated reserve fund.  For the contingent 
debt purchase decision it is of only second order concern as to how any increase in reserves is 
distributed.  We will assume a static budget allocation strategy, but the end of ten year reserves 
need not be interpreted literally as an increase in dedicated reserve fund; any increase in reserves 
could just as well be passed back to government. 
Figure 10 offers fan charts of the six projections: one with and one without contingent credit for 
each of the three examples.  As can be seen, the path of net reserves is similar to that of a random 
walk, and so the variance of net reserves increases over time.  The annual budget allocations for 
each of the three examples have been chosen so that the median net reserve also increases over 
time. Table 2 and Figure 11 present the distribution of net reserves at the end of ten years both with 
and without contingent credit purchase.  The purchase of contingent credit, and associated increase 
in risk retention, leads to an average increase in net reserves of 93% of AEL (US$520m) for 
agriculture in India, 312% of AEL (US$270m) for tropical cyclones in Fiji, and 1,313% of AEL 
(US$100m) for earthquakes in Costa Rica.  These average increases in net reserves are driven by the 
savings in reinsurance costs, with the higher relative increase for catastrophic risks, for which the 
average reinsurance multiple is high. 
Not only does contingent credit purchase increase the expected increase in reserves, in all three 
examples it leads to a distribution of net reserves which very nearly first order stochastic dominates 
the distribution without contingent credit purchase; the red lines in Figure 11 for the strategies with 
contingent credit are almost always below and to the right of the blue lines.  Therefore, for these 










































































































Earthquake in Costa Rica
Tropical Cyclone in Fiji  19   
 
credit purchase increases the potential upside without materially affecting the downside.  Figure 16 
in Appendix 3 presents the probability density functions of outcomes, to complement the 
cumulative density functions of Figure 11. 
 
Table 2. Net reserves of dedicated reserve fund at end of ten years  
Risk  Strategy  1st  10th  Median  90th  99th  Average 
Agriculture 
in India 
No contingent credit  -33%  19%  153%  594%  784%  245% 
Contingent credit of 
25% AEL 
-56%  6%  364%  676%  845%  338% 
Benefit from 
contingent credit 




No contingent credit  -97%  -7%  665%  1179%  1383%  573% 
Contingent credit of 
35% AEL 
-105%  31%  1016%  1319%  1493%  885% 
Benefit from 
contingent credit 




No contingent credit  -337%  594%  1465%  1916%  2167%  1347% 
Contingent credit of 
1,100% AEL 
1983%  2369%  2686%  2933%  3096%  2660% 
Benefit from 
contingent credit 
+2,321%  +1,776%  +1,221%  +1,017%  +929%  +1,313% 
Notes:  1. Net reserves equal savings minus any outstanding debt 
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Figure 10.  Ten year projections of net reserves under strategies with and without contingent credit 
for India, Fiji and Costa Rica 
 
 
   
Note: The fan charts show the relative likelihood of possible outcomes. In each chart the central, dark band is the central 
projection: there is judged to be a 10% chance that net reserves will be within that central band at any date. The next 
deepest shade, on both sides of the central band, takes the distribution out to 20%; and so on, in steps of 10 percentage 































































































































































































































Costa Rica, with contingent credit  21   
 
Figure 11.  Modeled cumulative density functions of end of 10 year net reserves for strategies with 
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Figure 12 offers an alternative breakdown of the effect of contingent credit purchase on the 
distribution of net reserves at the end of ten years for each of the three examples.  For 66% of the 
loss histories for agriculture in India the strategy with contingent credit leads to larger end of ten 
year net reserves than the strategy with no contingent credit.  For the remaining 34% of loss 
histories, contingent credit purchase, and the corresponding increase in risk retention, leads to a 
decrease in end of ten year net reserves.  The corresponding percentages for tropical cyclones in Fiji 
and earthquakes in Costa Rica are 87%/13% and 100%/0% respectively. 
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In all three examples, the benefit from contingent credit purchase would be lower if the reserve 
funds were to start with much larger initial reserves.  The benefit of contingent credit is to allow risk 
retention in layers for which reinsurance is poor value.  If the reserve fund can retain an appropriate 
amount of risk without contingent credit then contingent credit purchase is unnecessary.  In 
practice, a government may be restricted in the level of initial reserves that may be allocated to a 
dedicated reserve fund.  In such a case, contingent credit purchase is likely to be optimal, to allow 
the reserves of the fund to increase quickly in initial years. 
 
4.  Conclusion 
This paper is part of the World Bank policy work to assist policy makers interested in establishing or 
strengthening financial strategies to increase the financial response capacity of governments of 
developing countries in the aftermath of natural disasters while protecting their long-term fiscal 
balance.  It provides a technical background for the use of contingent credit in sovereign risk 
financing and offers a dynamic financial tool to guide policy makers in the design of optimal 
sovereign financial strategies based on a combination of reserves, contingent credit and reinsurance.   
The theoretical models first provide an economic rationale for catastrophe risk layering: 
retention/self-insurance finances the bottom risk layer; contingent credit is usually efficient to 
finance middle-risk layer; and risk transfer instruments like reinsurance finances the top risk layer.  It 
also provides a simple model to compare the cost of reinsurance and the cost of contingent credit 
for a given risk layer by deriving the multiple of each financial product. 
The dynamic financial tool is illustrated in three case studies: agricultural production risk in India, 
tropical cyclone risk in Fiji and earthquake risk in Costa Rica.  The model offers visualization tools to 
assist in the dialogue of catastrophe risk financing and contingent credit with the governments of 
developing countries.  It calculates in particular the potential savings generated by a contingent 
credit facility but also shows that, by allowing a government to retain risk, purchase of contingent 
credit can make the country worse off in case of very bad years. 
The financial protection of the state against natural disasters has gained increasing attention among 
the developing countries, the donor community and the international financial institutions, and is a 
major pillar of the proactive disaster risk management framework.  It is incorrect to reduce disaster 
risk financing to catastrophe insurance; not only is protection against 1-in-5 year events important, 
just as protection against 1-in-100 year events, but in practice it may be difficult to sustain a 
program that protects against 1-in-100 year events if adequate protection is not available for 1-in-5 
year events. 
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Appendix 1 
Proof of Proposition 1 
Clearly, in any optimal schedule                 or the agent could reduce      and      by 
                and consume an additional                              at time-1, with 
unchanged consumption in time-2. 
Under the parameter restrictions specified above this program is convex and so we may characterize 
the solution through the first-order conditions.
7  Denoting   as the Lagrange multiplier for the 
insurer’s zero profit constraint and    to    as the Lagrange multipliers for the sign restrictions of ( 
14b ), the first-order conditions include the following: 
    
     
                                   
( 17 ) 
    
     
                                                          
( 18 ) 
    
     
                                                   
( 19 ) 
                                     for all    ( 20 ) 
                                                            for all    ( 21 ) 
First we prove the characteristics of layer 5. Due to the concavity of  , ( 17 ) implies that if          
then       is some constant floor    which solves             .  Moreover, if            then 
        . 
So we have shown that      acts to offer a lower floor on consumption.  We must now show that 
         whenever         .  Consider an   with             .  The constraint            
applied to equation ( 18 ) puts an upper bound on the maximum possible      as the     which solves 
                                 .  This upper bound     must be at least as large as   or   could be 
reduced, reducing the cost of contingent credit but not reducing the benefit.  Therefore: 
                                     ( 22 ) 
and for          it cannot be that          or equations ( 18 ) and ( 20 ) could not both hold.  If 
             then          from above.  Putting all this together we can define    as the solution 
to                                 This proves the characteristics of layer 5. 
Next we prove the characteristics of layers 1 to 4.  Define    as the solution to                   
                    ,    as the solution to                                         and    as the 
solution to                                                 .  Now              due to the 
strict concavity of  ,       and our restriction of attention to solutions with      .          for 
        from ( 19 ) and          for        from ( 20 ).  All we need prove now is that             
  for          .  This follows from equation ( 18 ) and the restriction          . 
  
Proof of Corollary 1 
                                                           
 
7 The optimal insurance schedule can be characterized in terms of stochastic dominance arguments alone 
(Gollier and Schlesinger, 1996).  Conditional on the optimal insurance schedule the savings and contingent 
credit purchase decision problem is clearly convex.   26   
 
Suppose that       and      .           for all  .    can be set to anything without increasing the 
cost and so           for all  .  We therefore need only show that there is some state   in which 
         .  There will be such a state if                                   , and this will hold if 
                , that is if    is large enough.  The result follows from the twice differentiability of the 
objective function. 
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Appendix 2 
Table 3: Assumptions used in stochastic projections 
Worked Example  1. Agricultural 
insurance in India 
2. Tropical cyclone 
insurance in Fiji 
3. Earthquake 
insurance in Costa Rica 
Loss Distribution 
(USD million and % of AEL): 









  560 (100%) 
480 (86%) 































Annual budget allocation 




 160 (190%) 
 
24 (300%) 
Contingent credit amount: 
USD million and % of AEL 


















Term of drawn down loan 
Annual capital repayment 
after grace period 
 
0.50% of loan facility, payable at start of year 1 




1/25 of drawn down loan 
Investment return  0% between premiums paid in year t and claims paid in year t 
3.0% between claims paid in year t and premiums paid in year t+1 
Contingent credit lending 
rate 
4.4% 




attachment  point 
80% of AEL 
Reinsurance exhaust point  1-in-500 years 
Reinsurance multiple: 
0% to 50% 
50% to 100% 
100% to 150% 
150% to 400% 









Note:  Reinsurance multiple is cost of purchasing reinsurance for layer divided by expected loss from layer. 
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Appendix 3 
Figure 13.  Scenario 1: Low average claims throughout ten years 
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Figure 14.  Scenario 2: High loss once savings have been built up 
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Figure 15.  Scenario 3: High loss before savings have been built up 
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Figure 16.  Modeled probability density functions of end of 10 year net reserves for strategies 
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No contingent loan 
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